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Trends in Suicide Terrorism : Sense and Nonsense

Presented to World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on terrorism, Erice, Sicily, August 2004

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The past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last quarter century. Most of these were religiously motivated. While most Westerners imagine a tightly coordinated transnational terrorist organization headed by al-Qaeda, it seems more likely that nations under attack face a set of largely autonomous groups and cells pursuing their own regional aims. Repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attack. Like pounding mercury with a hammer, this sort of top-heavy counterstrategy only seems to generate more varied and insidious forms of suicide terrorism. Even with many top Qaeda leaders now dead or in custody, the transnational Jihadist fraternity is transforming into a hydra-headed network more difficult to fight than before.

Poverty and lack of education *per se* are not root causes of suicide terrorism. And Muslims who have expressed support for martyr actions and trust in Osama Bin Laden or the late Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin do not as a rule hate democratic freedoms or Western culture, although many despise American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations – especially regarding civil liberties – are critical factors in generating support for suicide terrorism.

The United States, Israel, Russia and other nations on the frontline in the war on terror need to realize that military and counterinsurgency actions achieve only tactical, not strategic responses to suicide terrorism, the most politically destabilizing and psychologically devastating form of terrorism. When these nations back oppressive and unpopular governments (even those deemed “partners in the war on terror”) this only generates popular resentment and support for terrorism against those governments and their backers. To attract potential recruits away from Jihadist martyrdom – suicide terrorism’s most virulent strain - and to dry up its popular support, requires addressing basic grievances before a downward spiral sets in where core meaning in life is sought, and found, in religious networks that sanctify vengeance at any cost against stronger powers, even if it kills the avenger.

Growing Threat of Suicide Terrorism

Suicide attacks have become more prevalent globally, gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of national life and international relations. The first major contemporary suicide attack was the December 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, probably by Iranian agents, that left 27 dead and more than 100 injured. From 1980 to 2001, political scientist Robert Pape observed that 188 suicide attacks took place, most for non-religious motives.¹ According to an August 2003 congressional report “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks” this represented only three percent of terrorist attacks worldwide during this time period but accounted for nearly half of all deaths.²

The history of suicide bombings since the early 1980s demonstrates how such attacks have generally achieved attackers’ near-term strategic goals, such as forcing withdrawal from areas subject to attack, causing destabilization, and demonstrating vulnerability by radically upsetting life routines. In

Lebanon, Hizbollah (“Party of God”) initiated the first systematic contemporary suicide attack campaign in 1983, killing hundreds of U.S. and French soldiers in coordinated truck bombings, compelling the United States and France to withdraw their remaining forces. Hizbollah had dramatically lessened its strategic reliance on suicide bombing by 1992, when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections and become a “mainstream” political party, and after achieving its main objective of forcing Israel to abandon most of the territorial and political gains made during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad used suicide attacks to effectively derail the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement that was designed to serve as the foundation of a peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. In Sri Lanka, Tamil Eelam (“Tamil Homeland”) only recently suspended its suicide squads of Tamil Tigers after wresting control of Tamil areas from the Sinhalese-dominated government and forcing official recognition of some measure of Tamil autonomy. Suicide bombings by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in spring 2003 accompanied a drastic reduction in the U.S. military and civilian presence in the country. Of course, the September 11 attacks themselves were suicide attacks.

Newer trends since the start of the millennium pose distinct challenges, making the threat posed by suicide terrorism not only more prominent in recent years but also more frequently religiously motivated. From 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks killed more than 5,300 people in 17 countries and wounded many thousands more (Table 1).³ At least 70 percent of these attacks were religiously motivated, with more than 100 attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates acting in al-Qaeda’s name (Table 2).

Even more ominous, Islamic Jihadi groups are now networked in ways that permit “swarming” by actors contracted from different groups who home in from scattered locations on multiple targets and then disperse, only to form new swarms. Multiple coordinated suicide attacks across countries and even continents is the adaptive hallmark of al-Qaeda’s continued global web-making.⁴ The war in Iraq has energized so many disparate groups that the Jihadist network is better prepared than ever to carry on without bin Laden.⁵ The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London reports that: “The counter-terrorism effort has perversely impelled an already highly decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more ‘virtual’ and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize.”⁶

Each country in which suicide attack has occurred has seen people become more suspicious and afraid of one another. Emboldened by the strategic successes of suicide-sponsoring terrorist organizations in upsetting the long-term political calculations and daily living routines of its foes, and by increasing support and recruitment among Muslim populations angered by U.S. actions in Iraq, Jihadi groups believe they are proving able to mount a lengthy and costly war of attrition. Even U.S. Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld himself lamented: “The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost of millions.”⁷

The longer this war of attrition lasts, the greater the long-term strategic risk of radicalizing Muslim sentiment against the United States, of undermining the United States’ international alliances, and of causing serious and sustained discontent among the American people. A White House panel reported in October 2003 that Muslim hostility toward the United States “has reached shocking levels” and is growing steadily.⁸ In April 2004, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned: “There is hatred of the Americans like never before in the region.”⁹ Margaret Tutwiler, U.S. Undersecretary of State for diplomacy, bemoaned to a Congressional committee in February 2004 that: “It will take us many years of hard, focused work” to restore U.S. credibility, even among traditional allies.¹⁰ Most Americans today feel no safer from terrorism, more distrustful of many longstanding allies, and increasingly anxious about the future. A survey released in early spring 2004 by the nonpartisan Council for Excellence in Government found that fewer than half of all Americans think the country is safer than it was on 9/11, and more than three-quarters expect the U.S. to be the target of a major terrorist attack in the near future.¹¹

There is good reason to be anxious. One distinct pattern in the litany of terrorist atrocities is that there has been an increasing interest in well-planned attacks designed to net the highest numbers of civilian casualties. Charting data from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Robert Axelrod, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, observes that a very few terrorist attacks account for a very large percentage of all casualties (Figure 1). Not only does this trend call for anticipating attacks with ever broader political, economic and social effects, it also seems to point to an eventual suicide attack using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Although that may take some time to effectively plan, long-term planning has proven to be al-Qaeda's hallmark.

“God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons,” proclaimed Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Pakistan's Harkat ul-Mujahideen on the CBS television news show *60 Minutes II*.¹² A subsequent suicide attack on India's Parliament in December 2001 by Jaish-e-Muhammed, a Pakistani splinter group of the al-Qaeda affiliate that Khalil heads, perhaps brought nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹³ Imagine what these people could do with the non-conventional weapons they actively seek.

In sum, terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks and the trend points to a catastrophic unconventional terrorist attack that could make the March 11 Madrid or September 11 New York and Washington attacks pale in comparison. The U.S. strategic response relies on overwhelming military force to crush evolving Jihadist swarms, but this inflexible and maladaptive strategy only propagates leaner and meaner mutations of suicide networks and cells.

Suicide Terror Today

Repeated suicide actions in the disputed regions of Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and now in U.S.-occupied Iraq show that military action has not stopped, or even reliably diminished, the incidence of suicide attacks. For example, from 1993 through 2003, 311 Palestinian suicide attackers launched themselves against Israeli targets. In the first 7 years of suicide bombing, 70 percent (43 of 61 attempts) were successful in killing other people. From the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000 through 2003, however, while the success rate declined to 52 percent, the number of attacks increased from 61 to 250, with 129 of those successful (up from 43).¹⁴

The trend is even more alarming in Iraq and elsewhere. On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq and “one victory in the war on terror that began on 9/11.”¹⁵ Cofer Black, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, declared soon thereafter that al-Qaeda had to “put up or shut up... They had failed. It proves the global war on terrorism is effective.”¹⁶ Within just two weeks, a wave of Jihadist suicide bombings hit Saudi Arabia Morocco, Israel, and Chechnya. Collectively, these attacks were more numerous and widespread than any in the preceding 12 months.

In October 2003, five full months after major military operations had been declared over, Iraq suffered its worst spate of suicide bombings to date. White House claims that such attacks only confirmed the “desperation”¹⁷ of terrorists in the face of increasing U.S. progress in the war on terrorism provided little evidence that the military response was working and were ridiculed by Arab commentators.¹⁸ A November 2003 suicide attack on Italian forces in southern Iraq convinced several countries not to participate in the military occupation, and spurred the United States to accelerate its timetable for transferring authority to Iraqis.

Outside Iraq, suicide bombings in Turkey by self-declared friends of al-Qaeda, also in November, sought to undermine the best example of nonsectarian and democratic rule in the Muslim world, and extended the strategic threat to NATO's underbelly. In December 2003, renewed attacks by Chechnya's

“black widows” (women allowed by militant Islamic leaders to become martyrs, usually because of what Russian soldiers have done to their husbands, fathers and brothers) brought terror to Russian civilians. During the year-end holidays, alerts for al-Qaeda suicide skyjackings brought continuous air patrols and surface-to-air missiles to major U.S. cities and caused cancellations of several international flights. Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf barely escaped assassination on Christmas Day when two suicide truck bombers from Jaish-e-Muhammed rammed his motorcade.

And all of this occurred despite the fact that State Department funding for counterstrategies to combat terrorism overseas increased 133 percent from September 11, 2001, through fiscal year 2003, according to the final U.S. Federal Interagency report on *Combating Terrorism*.¹⁹ Including the Iraq theater (originally billed as a war of necessity to deny weapons of mass destruction from al-Qaeda and its associates), U.S. Department of Defense budget increases and emergency supplemental measures, the bill for foreign operations in the war on terrorism into 2004 exceeds \$200 billion. Yet the incidence and impact of suicide terrorism have not declined. Of course, not all of this “hard power” spending on terrorism is wasted, but the nearly exclusive reliance on military might has not stifled the martyr’s appeal or stalled the threat.

In fact, 2003 witnessed more suicide attacks (98) than any year in contemporary history. A plurality (33) occurred in Iraq, now plagued with suicide terror for the first time since the thirteenth century *hashasheen* (“assassins”) slaughtered fellow Muslims and Crusaders to purify Islamic lands (it took the Mongols to stop them) (Table 1). In the first four months of 2004, 60 suicide attackers killed nearly 800 people and wounded thousands. There were first-time suicide attacks in Uzbekistan (by female bombers) and in Western Europe (the “no-surrender” suicide explosion by the cornered plotters of the Madrid train bombings) (Table 3). In Iraq alone (which has so far been budgeted nearly \$200 billion as part of the “War on Terror”), 30 ten suicide bombers killed nearly 600 people — a greater number by far than in any single country for any comparable period since the attacks of September 11. Even a casual glance at media outlets and websites sympathetic to al-Qaeda reveals a proliferating Jihadist fraternity that is not deterred by Saddam’s capture, but rather, takes heart from the fall of Iraq’s secularist tyrant.²⁰

In short, the record clearly demonstrates that military actions against terrorism and its purported sponsors have not come close to squelching suicide terror. At a minimum, an effective strategy for combating suicide terrorism requires a layered approach that works on three levels in a coordinated way:

- A last line of defense involves the attempt to protect sensitive populations and installations from attack. Mostly through development and use of scientific technology, efforts are made to block suicide terrorists from hitting their targets or to lessen (through preparation) the effects of an attack that has not been prevented.
- A middle line of defense involves preemptively penetrating and destroying terror organizations and networks, mostly through a combination of intelligence and military action.
- A first line of defense involves understanding and acting on the root causes of terrorism so as to drastically reduce the receptivity of potential recruits to the message and methods of terror-sponsoring organizations, mostly through political, economic, and social action programs.

Billions upon billions of dollars have been targeted on countermeasures associated with the last and middle lines of defense (protection, mitigation, preemption). These measures may have helped to thwart a steep rise in suicide attacks; however, they have produced no appreciable decline of suicide terrorism.

Unfortunately, the same U.S. Federal Interagency report on *Combating Terrorism* that documents the significant increase in funding for combating terrorism, and reviews plans and activities by dozens of

civil and military agencies, reveals scant evidence of serious effort or funding to understand why individuals become, or to prevent individuals from becoming, terrorists in the first place. Even more serious than the scarce interest and funding on this score thus far, however, is the fact that current U.S. policies that do attempt to address the underlying factors of suicide terrorism are woefully misguided. The record suggests that addressing these root causes might provide a more promising approach.

Misconceiving Root Causes

A common notion in the U.S. administration and media spin on the war against terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded or homicidal misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy. This portrayal lends a sense of hopelessness to any attempt to address root causes because some individuals will always be desperate or deranged enough to conduct suicide attacks. But as logical as the poverty-breeds-terrorism argument may seem, study after study shows that suicide attackers and their supporters are rarely ignorant or impoverished. Nor are they crazed, cowardly, apathetic or asocial. The common misconception underestimates the central role that organizational factors play in the appeal of terrorist networks. A better understanding of such causes reveals that the challenge is actually manageable: the key is not to profile and target the most despairing or deranged individual but to understand and undermine the organizational and institutional appeal of terrorists' motivations and networks.

The U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* highlights the “War of Ideas” and “War on Poverty” as adjunct programs to reduce terrorism’s pool of support and recruitment.²¹ The war of ideas is based on the premise that terrorists and their supporters “hate our freedoms,” a sentiment Bush has expressed both with regard to al-Qaeda and to the Iraqi resistance.²² Yet survey data reliably show that most Muslims who support suicide terrorism and trust Osama bin Laden favor elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity, and economic choice.²³ Mark Tessler, who coordinates long-term surveys of Muslim societies from the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, finds that Arab attitudes toward American culture are most favorable among young adults—the same population that terrorist recruiters single out—regardless of their religious orientation.²⁴ Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research, consistently finds that a majority of Palestinians has a favorable impression of U.S. (and Israeli) forms of government, education, economy, and even literature and art, even though nearly three-fourths of the population supports suicide attack.²⁵

In sum, there is no evidence that most people who support suicide actions hate Americans’ internal cultural freedoms (cf. Table 4 on Algerian attitudes), but rather, every indication that they oppose U.S. foreign policies, particularly regarding the Middle East. After the 1996 suicide attack against U.S. military housing at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, a Defense Department Science Board report stated: “Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.”²⁶ U.S. intervention in Iraq is but the most recent example. A United Nations report indicated that as soon as the United States began building up for the Iraq invasion, Qaeda recruitment had picked up in 30 to 40 countries.²⁷ Recruiters for groups sponsoring terrorist acts were telling researchers that volunteers were beating down the doors to join.

Similarly, the war on poverty is based on the premise that impoverishment, lack of education, and social estrangement spawn terrorism. Economist Gary Becker’s theory that the greater the amount of human capital (including income and education) a person accumulates, the less likely that person is to commit a crime.²⁸ The theory is that the greater a person’s human capital, the more that person is aware of losing out on substantial future gains if captured or killed. Similar thinking applies to suicide terror: the less promising one’s future, the more likely one’s choice to end life. Almost all current U.S. foreign aid programs related to terrorism pivot on such assumptions, now generally accepted by the mainstream of both U.S. political parties, but although the theory has proven useful in combating blue-collar crime, no evidence indicates its bearing on terror.

Studies by Princeton economist Alan Krueger and others find no correlation between a nation's per capita income and terrorism,²⁹ but do find a correlation between a lack of civil liberties, defined by Freedom House,³⁰ and terrorism. A recent National Research Council report, *Discouraging Terrorism*, finds: "Terrorism and its supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies of extreme political repression and discouraged by policies of incorporating both dissident and moderate groups responsibly into civil society and the political process."³¹ U.S. backing of weak, failed, and corrupt states generates animosity and terrorism against the U.S. There seems to be a direct correlation between U.S. military aid to politically corroded or ethnically divided states,³² human rights abuses by those regimes,³³ and rise in terrorism,³⁴ as initially moderate opposition is pushed into common cause with more radical elements.

Despite these realities, the meager U.S. monies available for non-military foreign aid are far too concentrated in poverty reduction and literacy enhancement. In fact, in Pakistan, literacy and dislike for the United States have increased nonetheless while the number of Islamist *madrassa* schools grew from 3,000 to nearly 40,000 since 1978. According to the U.S. State Department report, *September 11 One Year Later*, development aid is based "on the belief that poverty provides a breeding ground for terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed this conviction,"³⁵ and Bush declared at a UN conference on poor nations in Monterrey, Mexico: "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror."³⁶ Yet study after study demonstrates that suicide terrorists and their supporters are not abjectly poor, illiterate, or socially estranged.³⁷

Another misconception that implicitly drives current national security policy is that suicide terrorists have no rational political agenda and are not sane. According to General Wesley Clark, unlike nineteenth-century Russian terrorists who wanted to depose the czar, current Islamic terrorists are simply retrograde and nihilist: "They want the destruction of Western civilization and the return to seventh-century Islam."³⁸ Senator John Warner testified that a new security doctrine of preemption was necessary because "those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational."³⁹ According to Vice President Dick Cheney, the September 11 plotters and other like-minded terrorists "have no sense of morality."⁴⁰

In truth, suicide terrorists on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology and are often wholly committed to what they believe to be devout moral principles. A report on *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism* used by the Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies (CIA and DIA) finds "no psychological attribute or personality distinctive of terrorists."⁴¹ Recruits are generally well adjusted in their families and liked by peers, and often more educated and economically better off than their surrounding population. Researchers Basel Saleh and Claude Berrebi independently find that the majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have a college education (versus 15 percent of the population of comparable age) and that less than 15 percent come from poor families (although about one-third of the population lives in poverty). DIA sources who have interrogated Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo note that Saudi-born operatives, especially those in leadership positions, are often "educated above reasonable employment level, a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families."⁴² The general pattern was captured in a Singapore Parliamentary report on prisoners from Jemaah Islamiyah, an ally of al-Qaeda: "These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised. Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organizations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs. Most detainees regarded religion as their most important personal value."⁴³

Except for being mostly young unattached males, suicide attackers differ from members of violent racist organizations to whom they are often compared, such as American white supremacist groups.⁴⁴ Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, jobless) or suicidal symptoms. Inconsistent with economic theories of criminal behavior, they do not kill themselves simply out of hopelessness or a sense of having nothing to lose. Muslim clerics countenance

killing oneself for martyrdom in the name of God but curse personal suicide. “He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit,” warned Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi (a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood), but “he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation... the Mujahed is full of hope.”⁴⁵

Another reason that personal despair or derangement may not be a significant factor in suicide terrorism is that the cultures of the Middle East, Africa and Asia where it thrives tend to be less ‘individualistic’ than our own, more attuned to the environmental and organizational relationships that shape behavior, and less tolerant of individuals acting independently from a group context.⁴⁶ Terrorists in these societies also would be more likely to be seeking group, or collective, sense of belonging and justification for their actions.

A group struggling to gain power and resources against materially better-endowed enemies must attract able and committed recruits—not loaners—who are willing to give up their lives for a cause. At the same time, the group must prevent uncommitted elements in the population from simply free-riding on the backs of committed fighters, that is, sharing in the fighters’ rewards and success without taking the risks or paying the costs of fighting. Insurgent groups manage this by offering potential recruits the promise of great future rewards instead of immediate gain, such as freedom for future generations or eternal bliss in Paradise. Only individuals committed to delayed gratification are then liable to volunteer. Insurgent groups also tend to seek out individuals with better education and economic prospects, because they view a person who invests resources in education and training for a better economic future as signaling willingness to sacrifice today’s satisfactions for tomorrow’s rewards and able to realize commitments. For this reason, relative level of education and economic status is often higher among insurgent groups that recruit primarily on the basis of promises for the future than among traditional armies that rely more on short-term incentives.⁴⁷

Relative Deprivation and Religious Redemption

The connection between suicide and terrorists and religion might be explained by the role that religious ethnic groups can play. Ethnic groups offer a good foundation for sustaining resource-deficient insurgencies because they provide a social structure that can underpin the maintenance of reputations and the efficient gathering of information about recruits. But ethnicity alone may not be enough; religion may also be needed to cement commitment. A comparison of ethnic Palestinians with ethnic Bosnian Muslims (matched for age, income, education, exposure to violence, etc.) shows the Palestinians much more liable to use religious sentiments to confidently express of hope for the future by willingness to die for the group, whereas the Bosnians do not express religious sentiments, hope or willingness to die.⁴⁸ Martyrdom, which involves “pure” commitment to promise over payoff, and unconditional sacrifice for fictive “brothers,” will more likely endure in religious ethnic groups.

None of this denies that popular support for terrorism is sustained, in part, by economic factors, such as explosive population growth and underemployment, coupled with the failure of rigidly authoritarian governments to provide youth outlets for political and economic advancement. Middle Eastern and more broadly most Muslim societies, whose populations double within one generation or less, have age pyramids with broad bases: each younger age group is substantially larger (more people) than the next older. Even with states that allowed for a modicum of political expression or economic employment, society’s structure of opportunities can have trouble keeping pace with population.

Regional governments are increasingly unable to provide these opportunities, enhancing the attractiveness of religious organizations that are able to recruit tomorrow’s suicide terrorists. Weak and increasingly corrupt and corroded nationalist regimes in Muslim countries have sought to eliminate all secular opposition. To subdue popular discontent in the post-colonial era, the Ba’athist socialist dictators

of Syria and Iraq, the authoritarian prime ministers of Pakistan and Malaysia, the monarchs of Morocco and Jordan, and the imperial presidents of Egypt, Algeria, the Philippines and Indonesia, all initially supported militant Islamic groups. To maintain their bloated bureaucracies and armies, these “failed states” – all poor imitations of Western models with no organic history in the Arab and Muslim world - readily delegated responsibility for the social welfare of their peoples to activist Islamic groups eager to take charge. These groups provided schooling and health services more efficiently and extensively than governments were able to, offering a “desecularized” path to fulfill modernity’s universal mission to improve humanity. When radical Islam finally vented political aspirations – beginning with the 1965 “Islamic Manifesto,” *Milestones*, written in prison by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayyid Qutb just before he was hanged for sedition by Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser - popular support proved too deep and widespread to extinguish.

Although the process of rising aspirations followed by dwindling expectations that generates terror can be identified, disentangling the relative significance of political and economic factors in the Muslim world is difficult and perhaps even impossible. During the 1990s, momentous political developments in Algeria (multiparty elections, including Islamic groups in 1992), Palestine (Oslo Peace Accords in 1993), Chechnya (dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of communist control), Indonesia (Suharto’s resignation in 1998 and the end of dictatorship), and elsewhere fanned rising aspirations among Muslim peoples for political freedom and economic advancement. In each case, economic stagnation or decline followed as political aspirations were thwarted (the Algerian Army cancelled elections, the Israel-Palestine Camp David negotiations broke down, Russia cracked down on Chechnya’s bid for autonomy, and Suharto army loyalists and paramilitary groups fomented interethnic strife and political disaccord).

Support and recruitment for suicide terrorism occur not under conditions of political repression, poverty, and unemployment or illiteracy as such, but when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical organizations can exploit. For this purpose, relative deprivation is more significant than absolute deprivation. Unlike poorer, less educated elements of their societies—or equally educated, well-off members of our society—many educated, middle-class Muslims increasingly experience frustration with life as their potential opportunities are less attractive than their prior expectations. Frustrated with their future, the appeal of routine national life declines and suicide terrorism gives some perceived purpose to act altruistically, in the potential terrorist’s mind, for the welfare of a future generation.

Revolutionary terror imprints itself into history when corrupt and corroded societies choke rising aspirations into explosive frustration.

Organization and the Banality of Evil

This frustrating confluence of circumstances helps to account for terrorism’s popular support and endurance but not the original spark that ignites people’s passions and minds. Most people in the world who suffer stifling, even murderous, oppression do not become terrorists. As with nearly all creators and leaders of history’s terrorist movements, those who conceive of using suicide terrorism in the first place belong mostly to an intellectual elite possessing sufficient material means for personal advancement but who choose a life of struggle and sacrifice for themselves and who often require even greater commitment from their followers. Their motivations are not personal comfort or immediate material gain. Rather, their motivation is religious or ideological conviction and zeal, whose founding assumptions, like those of *any* religion, cannot be rationally scrutinized, and for which they inspire others to believe in and die. But arational motivations don’t preclude rational actions.

Sponsors of martyrdom are not irrational. Using religious sentiments for political or economic purposes can be eminently rational, as when martyrdom or missionary actions gain recognition, recruits, and power in order to increase political “market share”⁴⁹ (to gain in the competition for political influence in a regional context, within the larger Muslim community, or with the rest of the world). Dwindling returns on individuals’ future prospects in life translate into higher levels of recruitment and prompt returns for terrorist groups and leaders. This degree of manipulation usually works only if the manipulators themselves make costly, hard-to-fake commitments, however.

Through indoctrination of recruits into relatively small and closeted cells—emotionally tightknit brotherhoods—terror organizations create a family of cellmates who are just as willing to sacrifice for one another as a parent for a child. Consider the “Oath to Jihad” taken by recruits to Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, a Pakistani affiliate of the *World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders*, the umbrella organization formed by Osama Bin Laden in 1998. The oath affirms that by their sacrifice members help secure the future of their family of fictive kin: “Each [martyr] has a special place—among them are brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear.”⁵⁰ These culturally contrived cell loyalties mimic and (at least temporarily) override genetically based fidelities to kin while securing belief in sacrifice to a larger group cause. The mechanism of manipulation resembles that of the U.S. army (and probably most armies), which trains soldiers in small groups of committed buddies who then grow willing to sacrifice for one another, and only derivatively for glory or country (motherland, fatherland).

Key to intercepting that commitment before it solidifies is grasping how, like the best commercial advertisers but to ghastlier effect, charismatic leaders of terrorist groups turn ordinary desires for kinship and religion into cravings for the mission they are pitching, to the benefit of the manipulating organization rather than the individual manipulated. Therefore, understanding and parrying suicide terrorism requires concentrating more on the organizational structure, indoctrination methods, and ideological appeal of recruiting organizations than on personality attributes of the individuals recruited. No doubt individual predispositions render some more susceptible to social factors that leaders use to persuade recruits to die for their cause. But months—sometimes years—of intense indoctrination can lead to blind obedience no matter who the individual.⁵¹

Part of the answer to what leads a normal person to suicide terror may lie in philosopher Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil,” which she used to describe the recruitment of mostly ordinary Germans, not sadistic lunatics, to man Nazi extermination camps.⁵² In the early 1960s, psychologist Stanley Milgram tested her thesis. He recruited Yale students and other U.S. adults to supposedly help others learn better. When the learner, hidden by a screen, failed to memorize arbitrary word pairs fast enough, the helper was instructed to administer an electric shock, and to increase voltage with each erroneous answer (which the learner, actually an actor, deliberately got wrong). Most helpers complied with instructions to give potentially lethal shocks (labeled as 450 volts, but in fact 0) despite victims’ screams and pleas. This experiment showed how situations can be staged to elicit blind obedience to authority, and more generally that manipulation of context can trump individual personality and psychology to generate apparently extreme behaviors in ordinary people.⁵³

Social psychologists have long documented what they call “the fundamental attribution error,” the tendency for people to explain human behavior in terms of individual personality traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. This attribution error leads many in the West to focus on the individual suicide terrorists rather than the organizational environment which produces them. If told that someone has been ordered to give a speech supporting a particular political candidate, for example, most people in Western society will still think that the speaker believes what he is saying. This interpretation bias seems to be especially prevalent in individualistic cultures, such as those of the United States and Western Europe, as opposed to collectivist cultures, such as Africa and Asia. Portrayals by the U.S. government and media of suicide bombers as deranged cutthroats may also suffer

from a fundamental attribution error: no instance has yet occurred of religious or political suicide terrorism resulting from the lone action of a mentally unstable bomber (e.g., a suicidal Unabomber) or someone acting entirely under his own authority and responsibility (e.g., a suicidal Timothy McVeigh). The key is the organization, not the individual.

For organizations that sponsor suicide attack to thrive—or even survive—against much stronger military foes, they need strong community support. Yet the reasons for that communal support can differ among people. Among Palestinians, perceptions of historical injustice combine with personal loss and humiliation at the hands of their Israeli occupiers to nurture individual martyrs and general popular support for martyr actions. Palestinian economist Basel Saleh observes that a majority of Palestinian suicide bombers had prior histories of arrest or injury by Israel’s army, and many of the youngest suicide shooters had family members or close friends with such a history.⁵⁴ Khalil Shikaki, a psychologist and Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, has preliminary survey data suggesting that popular support for suicide actions may be positively correlated with the number of Israeli checkpoints that Palestinians have to regularly pass through to go about their daily business and the time needed to pass through them (this can involve spending hours at each of several checkpoints, any of which can be arbitrarily closed down any time to prevent through passage). Humiliation and revenge are the most consistent sentiments expressed by not just recruits but also their supporters, though expressed more as community grievances than as personal ones.⁵⁵

Although individual grievances generate support for terrorists and motivate some people to become recruits, debriefings with captured al-Qaeda operatives at Guantánamo and with Jemaah Islamiyah prisoners in Singapore suggest that recruitment to these organizations is more ideologically driven than grievance-driven. Detainees evince little history of personal hardship but frequently cite relatives or respected community members who participated in earlier jihads, or close peers presently engaged, as influencing decisions to join the fight.⁵⁶ Of course, ideology and grievance are not mutually exclusive. Jessica Stern’s interviews with jihadists and their supporters in Kashmir reveal that both abound.

Despite numerous studies of individual behavior that show situation to be a much better predictor than personality in group contexts, Americans overwhelmingly believe that personal decision, success, and failure depend on individual choice, responsibility, and personality. This perception is plausibly one reason many Americans tend to think of terrorists as homicidal maniacs. “If we have to, we just mow the whole place down,” said Senator Trent Lott, exasperated with the situation in Iraq. “You’re dealing with insane suicide bombers who are killing our people, and we need to be very aggressive in taking them out.”⁵⁷ As Timothy Spangler, chairman of Republicans Abroad (a group of Americans living overseas that helps the Republican Party develop policy) recently put it, “We know what the causes of terrorism are—terrorists... It’s ultimately about individuals taking individual decisions to kill people.”⁵⁸ According to last year’s Pew survey, most of the world disagrees.⁵⁹ Although we cannot do much about personality traits, whether biologically influenced or not, we presumably can think of nonmilitary ways to make terrorist groups less attractive and undermine their effectiveness with recruits. That holds the key to defeating terrorism.

Soft Power Counterstrategy

Whatever the basis of community support for organizations that sponsor terrorism, that support needs to be the prime long-term focus of attention by U.S. policymakers and others who are interested in combating the threat they pose. For without community support, terrorist organizations that depend for information, recruitment and survival on dense networks of ethnic and religious ties and can no more thrive than fish out of water. No evidence (historical or otherwise) indicates that popular support for suicide terrorism will evaporate, or that individuals will cease to be persuaded by terrorists’ groups

promises of future rewards, without complicity in tackling at least some fundamental goals that suicide attackers and supporting communities share, such as denying support to discredited governments and going full press on ending the conflict in the Palestinian territories, whose daily images of violence engender global Muslim resentment.⁶⁰ Republicans and Democrats alike clamor for the allocation of billions of dollars to protect innumerable targets from suicide attackers. Guarding sensitive installations is a last line of defense, however, and probably the easiest line to breach because of the abundance of vulnerable targets and would-be attackers.

Preempting and preventing terrorism requires that U.S. policymakers make a concerted effort to understand the background conditions as well as the recruitment processes that inspire people to take their own lives in the name of a greater cause. Current political and economic conditions that policymakers currently monitor are important although not necessarily determinant. Rather, what likely matters more is the promise of redeeming real or imagined historical grievances through a religious (or transcendent ideological) mission that empowers the militarily weak with unexpected force against enemies materially much stronger. This was as true for Jewish Zealots who sacrificed themselves to kill Romans two millennia ago as it is for modern Jihadists.

Identifying sacred values in different cultures and how they compete for people's affections is surely a first step in learning how to prevent those values from spiraling into mortal conflict between societies. All religions, and many quasi-religious ideologies that make claims about laws of history or universal missions to reform humanity, are based on sacred values.⁶¹ Such values are linked to emotions that underpin feelings of cultural identity and trust. These emotion-laden sentiments are amplified into moral obligations to strike out against perceived opponents no matter the cost when conditions of relative deprivation get to a point where suicide terrorists actively seek alternatives because of lack of political and economic opportunity.

Such sentiments are characteristic of apparently arational, emotionally-driven commitments, including heartfelt romantic love and uncontrollable vengeance, which may have emerged under natural selection's influence, to override rational calculations based on seemingly impossible or very long odds of achieving individual goals, such as lasting security.⁶² In religiously-inspired suicide terrorism, these sentiments, again, are manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters and trainers, mostly for the organization's benefit at the expense of the individual. Such manipulation is an extreme form of a common practice, where society's ruling management demands readiness-to-die from its own members – and occasional execution of this demand – as a demonstration of faith in society. In times of crisis, every society routinely calls upon some of its own people to sacrifice their lives for the general good of the body-politic. For militant Jihadists, crisis is constant and unabating, and extreme sacrifice is necessary as long as there are non-believers (*kuffar*) in the world.

Policy may head off this downward spiral towards mortal conflict between incommensurable moral views of the world by helping to provide political and economic opportunity for some. But once that spiral starts for others, the task becomes much more difficult. Once values become sacred, negotiated tradeoffs based on balancing costs and benefits become taboo - much as selling off one's child or selling out one's country is taboo, no matter what the payoff is - and offers of compromise or exchange are met with moral outrage. Counting on military pressure, the economic power of globalization, or the Western media's powers of persuasion to get others to give up such values is probably a vain hope. Policymakers from nations that fight sacred terror and hope to defeat it need to circumscribe the point at which commitment becomes absolute and nonnegotiable and seek to reach people before they come to it.

Traditional top-heavy approaches, such as strategic bombardment, invasion, occupation, and other massive forms of coercion, cannot eliminate tactically innovative and elusive Jihadist swarms nor suppress their popular support. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center released in March

2004, nearly half of Pakistanis and substantial majorities of people in supposedly moderate Muslim countries, such as Morocco and Jordan, now support suicide bombings as a way of countering the application of military might by the United States in Iraq and by Israel in Palestine.⁶³

Regarding the Palestine/Israel conflict, polls by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre indicate that increased coercive measures by Israeli forces during the Second Intifada (fall 2000 – fall 2003) are positively correlated with Palestinian popular support for attacks. Support for suicide attack, in turn, directly correlates with (Tables 5 and 6):⁶⁴

- increased support for the principal radical Islamic groups, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,⁶⁵
- decreased popular support for the multiparty, non-sectarian Palestinian Authority and its President, Yasser Arafat,⁶⁶
- decreased optimism for the future, and decreased Palestinian readiness to follow the peace process toward a negotiated political solution.

Pinpoint responses may not be the answer either.⁶⁷ Kathleen Carley, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, has used intelligence reports and sophisticated computer modeling to monitor the changes in jihadist networks, including the cell responsible for the suicide bombing of the American embassy in Tanzania. She found that eliminating the “central actors” - that is, cell members who have the most ties to other cell members and to other groups - has actually spurred terrorists to adapt more quickly, and has been less effective in the long run than eliminated less-central foot soldiers (Figure 2). Thus targeted assassinations of known leaders (a favorite Israeli tactic) may be counterproductive,⁶⁸ in addition to causing public revulsion.

Rather than focusing on hard power as a last defense, the first line of defense should be convincing Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and charities that feed terrorist networks. For example, just a small percentage of what the U.S. spends on often ineffective counterinsurgency aid to unpopular governments can help to train teachers and administrators, build schools and dormitories, furnish books and computers, provide fellowships and stipends, and fund local invitations for all willing parties to discuss and debate. Radical Islamic and other terrorist groups often provide more and better educational, medical, and social welfare services than governments do; so democratic nations that fight terrorism must discretely help others in these societies to compete with – rather than attempt to crush – such programs for the bodies, minds and hearts of people.

Clearly, shows of military strength are not the way to end the growing menace of suicide terrorism: witness the failure of Israel’s and Russia’s coercive efforts to end strings of Palestinian and Chechnyan suicide bombings. Rather, those nations most threatened by suicide terrorism, in particular the world’s democracies, must show people the aspects of democratic cultures they most respect. These nations, should promote democracy, but must be ready to accept “democracy’s paradox”: if people choose representatives who America and its democratic allies don’t like, or who have different values or ways of doing things, still voters’ decisions must be accepted as long as this does not generate violence. Democratic self-determination in Palestine, Kashmir and Iraq – or for that matter, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia – will more likely reduce terrorism than more military and counterinsurgency aid. At the same time, America and its allies need to establish an intense dialogue with Muslim religious and community leaders to reconcile Islamic custom and religious law (*shari’a*) with internationally recognized standards for crime and punishment and human rights.

To address the problem of relative deprivation, the U.S. and its allies should promote economic choice. But people must be allowed to pick and chose those goods and values that they desire, and must

not be forced to privatize their traditional ways of trading and doing business any more than they should be forced to collectivize, neither should they be made to accept goods and values that they may not want in the name of “free markets” or “globalization.” Most important, America and its allies should actively seek to redress the denial of civil liberties, by withdrawing military and political support from those of its “partners in the war on terror”⁶⁹ who persistently infringe on human rights and deny political expression to their people, and by encouraging moderates to constructively argue for and against alternative visions for their societies. Candor and debate with open dissent instill confidence, but propaganda and manipulative public relations breed disaffection and distrust. As any good scientist or businessman knows, people who acknowledge errors can correct them to perform better, and in performing better they are better able to recognize and correct their errors. Of course, the U.S. can’t just unilaterally pull out of places that would then be threatened with collapse or hostile takeover. But long-term planning must not allow America and its allies to become embroiled in maintaining brutal and repressive regimes whose practices generate popular resentment and terrorism.

In addition, because it is the main target and foe of suicide attacks by Jihadists, the United States must work in concert with the international community to address the historical and personal grievances – whether perceived or actual - of people who have been denied the opportunity and power realize their hopes and aspirations for personal security, collective peace, environmental sustainability and cultural fulfillment. The festering conflicts and killing fields of Israel/Palestine, Pakistan/Kashmir/India, Russia/Chechnya, the Western Sahara, Mindanao, The Moluccas, or Bosnia should be as much of a concern and a prod to action as the current state of the world economy.

Finally, the United States has to stop insisting on planetary rights of interference in the belief that our vision of civilization is humanity’s last great hope or that U.S. national security depends on the world accepting “a single sustainable model of national success... right and true for every person, in every society.”⁷⁰ “America is a nation with a mission,” proclaimed President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address. Yet a key lesson of the Vietnam War, according to former defense secretary Robert McNamara, was the error in thinking “we’re on a mission. We weren’t then and we aren’t today. And we shouldn’t act unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. We don’t have the God-given right to shape every nation to our own image.”⁷¹ The new *National Security Strategy of the United States* frames America’s new global mission in words the President first used at Washington’s National Cathedral three days after 9/11: “our responsibility to history is... to rid the world of evil.” Of course, exorcising the world’s evil – or even all forms of terrorism - is as much an impossible mission as forever ending injustice (or earthquakes). More seriously, this publicized mission that pits America’s moral world of Good against the Jihadist world of Evil directly parallels the Jihadist division of the world between “The House of Islam” (*Dar al-Islam*) and “The House of War” (*Dar al-Harb*), and feeds Jihadism’s religious conviction and zeal as well its power to persuade recruits. This does the U.S. and its allies no good.

Clearly, none of this necessitates negotiating with terrorist groups that sponsor martyrs in the pursuit of goals such as al-Qaeda’s quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states with a global caliphate. Osama bin Laden and others affiliated with the mission of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders seek no compromise, and will probably fight with hard power to the death. For these groups and already committed individuals, using hard power is necessary. The tens of millions of people who sympathize with bin Laden, however, are likely open to the promise of soft-power⁷² alternatives that **most** Muslims seem to favor—elected government, freedom of expression, educational opportunity, economic choice. The historical precondition for such opportunity, as well as the popular legitimacy of any form of governance, to be effective, however, is to ensure that potential recruits in the Arab and Muslim world feel secure about their personal safety as well as their cultural heritage. Although such soft-power efforts may demand more patience than governments under attack or being pressured to reform typically politically tolerate in times of crisis, forbearance is necessary to avoid

increasingly catastrophic devastation to the United States, to its democratic allies, and to the future hopes of peoples who aspire to soft empowerment from a free world.

Epilogue.

“Civilization is intermittent.”

- Menahem Begin

To capture the hearts and souls of people around them, terrorist groups provoke their enemies into committing atrocities. Two millennia ago, the first Jewish Revolt against Roman occupation began with youths throwing stones, and Roman commanders telling their soldiers to sheathe their swords and defend themselves with wooden staves. The Jewish Zealots and Sicarii (“daggers”) upped the ante – much as Hamas would do later against Israelis and Iraqi insurgents increasingly do against America’s coalition - attacking Roman soldiers and their Greek underlings in self-sacrificial acts during public ceremonies. The Sicarii, who claimed to be freedom fighters but whom the Romans deemed terrorists, modeled their mission on Samson, who centuries before had brought down on himself a Philistine temple to help Israel.

The Jewish revolt ended with collective suicide of perhaps hundreds of Sicarii warriors and their families at the desert-fortress of Masada in 73 A.D. But that was hardly the end of the story. This “heroic” death inspired two subsequent revolts, ending with Rome expelling all Jews from Judea, including many Christians who still considered themselves Jews. Judea became “Palaestina,” renamed for the Philistines. The Jewish Diaspora spread a universalizing faith to the far corners of the world, eventually converting the Roman emperor Constantine and the Arabian chieftan Mohammed to monotheism.

Ever since the Enlightenment, the modern world’s major movements – the big “isms” of recent history - have been on a mission to invent “humanity” by saving it and making it their own. Modernism is the industrial legacy of monotheism (however atheist in appearance), secularized and scientifically applied. No non-monotheistic society (save Buddhism perhaps) ever considered that all people are, or should be, essentially of a kind. To many in our society, the 20th-century demise of colonialism, anarchism, fascism and communism left history’s playing field wide open to what Lincoln besought as “the last great hope of mankind,” our society’s ideal of democratic liberalism (though Lincoln, like Jefferson, foresaw that the U.S. would “meanly lose” this hope if advanced by the sword).⁷³ Even after 9/11, there is scant recognition that unforeseen events of history perpetually transform or destroy the best laid plans for historical engineering. Yet the catastrophic wars and revolutions of the modern era teach us that the more uncompromising the design and the more self-assured the designer, the harder both will fall.

If we take an evolutionary perspective on history, which frames success and failure in terms of the growth or decline of traits over populations (and, eventually, in terms of the growth or decline of populations themselves), then current U.S. (or Israeli) antiterrorism policies do not seem adaptive. Support for the U.S. (and Israel) is declining in the world as support for terrorism increases. Moreover, U.S. (and Israeli) procedures to combat terror are often predictable and reactive. Even the “new” security strategy of preemption is preponderantly about maintaining U.S. preponderance (the global status quo) using traditional military means and other Great Power tactics. By contrast, terrorist stratagems are increasingly innovative and proactive. Perhaps more important, increasingly many people in the world perceive the terrorists’ anti-American agenda to be turning the tide of history. Such perceptions invariably act upon the future in unpredictable ways that make it folly and hazardous to believe in the constancy “clashing civilizations,”⁷⁴ the inevitability of the world’s globalization (“Americanization” for some),⁷⁵ an overriding “logic of human destiny,”⁷⁶ or some guiding spirit that ultimately causes “the end of history” and political struggle in a “fully rational” (secular, democratic, economically liberal) world.⁷⁷

Whatever the final outcome, the more fixed that religious fundamentalisms become in their own messianic mission to “desecularize” modernity,⁷⁸ the more likely they, too, will miserably fail. The most extreme Jihadists sway between calls for their own Masada and a Holocaust for non-believers. Whereas some saw resistance to the Israeli attack on Jenin in spring 2002 as the “Palestinian Masada,”⁷⁹ others,

like Islamic Jihad leader Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, declaimed: “We are not creating a Palestinian Masada, but a Palestinian Karbala’a [speaking of the battle of Karbala’a in AD 680, which established "martyrdom" in Shi’ite tradition], which will hasten the second Jewish Masada . . . until the Zionist entity ceases to exist.”⁸⁰ For Abu Shihab al-Kandahari, in his *Fatwah* issued in the name of al-Qaeda: “Nuclear warfare is the solution for destroying America.”⁸¹ Defend against Jihadism we must, and help it to burn itself out. But let’s not add life to its forlorn mission by unrelentingly muscling others with our own.

Table 1. Incidences of suicide attack worldwide, 2000–2003.*

Country	Suicide attacks per year per country				Total no. of attacks	No. of Religious attacks	Total dead in all attacks
	2000	2001	2002	2003			
Afghanistan**				2	2	2	11
Chechnya/Russia**	8	1	1	10	20	20	382
China			2		2	0	5
Indonesia**			1	1	2	2	215
Iraq**				33	33	15	244
Kashmir/Jammu**	17	29	18	11	75	75	409
Kenya*			1		1	1	18
Morocco**				5	5	5	44
Pakistan**			2	2	4	4	84
Palestine/Israel	3	40	64	22	129	78	555
Philippines**			1	1	2	2	24
Saudi Arabia*		1		5	6	6	57
Sri Lanka***	14	4		1	19	0	205
Tunisia**			1		1	1	16
Turkey**		1		5	6	4	64
USA*		4			4	4	3002
Yemen*	1				1	1	19
SUM	43	80	91	98	312	220	5354

*al-Qaeda attacks

** Involving al-Qaeda associates

***LTTE attacks (Tamil Tigers)

* Note: This is the author's compilation, originally published as supporting online material in S. Atran, "Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism," *Science*, vol. 304, April 2, 2004, pp. 47-49, <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/304/5667/47/DC1>.

Table 2. Incidences of suicide attack by al-Qaeda and associated organizations, 2000 - 2003.

	Organization	Country	No. of attacks	No. of deaths	
Al-Qaeda		Yemen			
		(USS Cole)	2000	1	19
		USA			
		(9/11 attacks)	2001	4	3002
		Kenya			
			2002	1	18
		Saudi Arabia		4	37
		2001	1	2	
		2003	5	55	
Principal Al-Qaeda Associates					
	Abu Hafz al-Masri /Islamic Front Raiders	Turkey			
		2003	4	61	
	Al-Ansar Mujahideen	Chechnya			
	(probably others in 2001)	2002	1	80	
	(May attacks, probably others)	2003	2	29	
	Ansar al-Islam	Iraq			
	(perhaps involved in others)	2003	5	6	
	Harkat ul-Mujahideen/ Harkat ul-Islami	Pakistan			
	(Karachi Sheraton Hotel)	2002	1	14	
	Lashkar-Jhangvi	Pakistan			
	(Quetta Shi'ite mosque)	2003	1	48	
	(attempt on Pres. Musharraf)	2003	1	16	
	Lashkar-e-Tayibah	Pakistan			
	(Islamabad Protestant Church)	2002	1	6	
	Lashkar-e-Tayibah/Al Nasreen	Kashmir/Jammu			
		2000	15	74	
		2001	23	116	
		2002	10	49	
		2003	6	30	
	Jaish-e-Muhammed	Kashmir/Jammu			
		2000	1	3	
	(incl. India Parliament in Delhi)	2001	2	12	
	(J&K legislature)	2002	1	38	
		2003	2	1	
	Islamic Army for Lib. Holy Sites	Tunisia			
		2002	1	16	
	Salafia Jihadi	Morocco			
		2003	5	44	
	MILF or Abu Sayyaf	Philippines			
		2002	1	3	
		2003	1	21	
	Taliban	Afghanistan			
		2003	1	5	
	Jemaah Islamiyah	Indonesia			
	(Bali nightclub attack)	2002	1	202	
	(Jakarta Marriott Hotel attack)	2003	1	13	
Total			106	4179	

Table 3. Suicide attacks January 1 – April 30, 2004.*

Country	No. of attackers	No. of religious attackers	No. of deaths (incl. attackers)
Afghanistan*	3	3	7
Chechnya/Russia*	1	1	40
China	1		3
Iraq*	30	20	595
Pakistan*	2	2	46
Palestine/Israel	10	7	43
Saudi Arabia*	1	1	6
Spain*	6	6	6
Turkey*	1	1	3
Uzbekistan*	5	5	43
SUM	60	46	795

* Involvement of al-Qaeda associates

*Note: unlike Table 1, compilation here is by number of attackers rather than by number of incidents.

Table 4. Representative national poll of 1282 Algerians (spring 2002). The dependent variable is a composite index of four items asking about American people, culture, policy, and 9/11. Results show "anti-Americanism" linked to: discontent with the domestic political and economic situation, distrust of Europe, unhappiness, and desires for a stronger relationship between Islam and politics. "Anti-Americanism" is not reliably related to opposition to democracy, commitment to religion, strict versus liberal interpretation of Islam, and all demographic attributes (gender, age, education, social class, income).

Model *	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t - score	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-.248	.584		-.426	.671
confidence in parliament	.136	.054	.130	2.509	.013
how is the gov't doing	5.261 E-02	.022	.137	2.420	.016
economy run for few vs. all	-.278	.137	-.108	-2.030	.043
low confidence in EU	.336	.057	.296	5.891	.000
is respondent happy	-.176	.075	-.116	-2.353	.019
can people be trusted	5.808E-02	.134	.021	.432	.666
disagree that atheists are unfit	8.531 E-02	.042	-.104	-2.037	.042
religious politicians are best for the country	-.104	.045	-.126	-2.312	.021
democracy is not compatible with Islam	-1.865E-03	.041	-.002	-.045	.964
democratic system is not a good form of gov't	8.113E-02	.066	.059	1.221	.223
religious attendance	-1.858E-02	.027	-.047	-.684	.495
spend time with people at mosque	-3.919E-02	.046	-.053	-.861	.390
laws should be according to <i>shari'a</i>	2.075E-02	.047	.025	.442	.659
Islam: prohibits men/women in university	-5.053E-02	.038	-.072	-1.344	.180
gender	2.246E-02	.113	.012	.199	.843
age	-2.096E-02	.052	-.023	-.404	.687
education	-4.664E-02	.026	-.104	-1.794	.074
social class	-8.268E-03	.058	-.008	-.142	.887
income	2.043E-02	.027	.040	.770	.442

* Dependent Variable: Strong anti-American / anti-Western sentiment and approval of 9/11 (factor scores).

Source: Mark Tessler, Director, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

Table 5. Polls by Jerusalem Media & Communication Center of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 – October 2003) concerning: suicide attack (favorable or strongly favorable), optimism about the future (optimistic or strongly optimistic), the peace process (supportive or strongly supportive), evaluation of the Palestinian Authority (good or very good), political or religious faction most trusted (PA President Yasser Arafat, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin), political party or faction currently best able to help achieve goals (Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Figures represent percentages.

<i>Poll Date</i>	<i>suicide attack</i>	<i>optimism</i>	<i>Peace</i>	<i>PA</i>	<i>Arafat</i>	<i>Yassin</i>	<i>FATAH</i>	<i>HAMAS</i>	<i>PIJ</i>	<i>PFLP</i>
96-Dec		74.6	78.1		41.2	4.8	35.2	10.3	1.1	3.2
97-May	23.6	68.7	69.1	67.5	39.8	5.6	37.9	10.3	1.4	2.9
97-Jul/Aug	28.2	61.8	68	66.7	37.6	6.7	34.8	11.3	2.6	3.1
98-May		65.6	63.7	64.6	38.7	8.4	32.9	13.3	0.8	2.8
98-Aug		68.6	55.6		32.6	6.6	34.4	13.4	1.8	3.7
99-Mar	26.1	69	64	62	38.8	9.5	37.7	14.7	2.6	2
99-Aug		71.1	57.7	58.8	32.5	5.5	28	8.5	2.8	2
99-Oct		70.7	48		32	6.4	33.8	11.1	1.9	1.3
00-Jun		68		60.7	31.8	6.1	34.5	12		2.3
00-Dec	66.2	48.8		55.5	25.7	12.2	32.1	19.2	3	1.7
01-Apr	73.7	45.6		61.8	32.3	8	35.1	17.7	4.9	1.5
01-Jun	68.6	50.6	47.4	62.5	27.8	9.8	34.9	18.6	5.2	2.7
01-Dec	64.6	44.8	42.4	44.9	24.5	12.8	26.1	21.3	5.3	3
02-Mar	72	48.3	49.9	58.9	27.9	9.7	29.5	19.8	3.7	3.9
02-Jun	68.1	42.3	46.6		25.1	8.8	27.3	22.6	4.2	3.7
02-Sep	64.3	42.6	46.5	43.3						
02-Dec	62.7	41.2	54.1		25.5	11.5	28.1	20.1	5.7	2.1
03-Apr	59.9	43.4	51.3		21.1	9.7	22.6	22	6.3	2
03-Oct	61.8	40.8			26.1	11.2	29.3	22.6	5.4	3.6

JMCC polls available at <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html>

Table 6. Correlations among items in JMCC polls of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 – October 2003): suicide attack (favorable or strongly favorable), optimism about the future (optimistic or strongly optimistic), the peace process (supportive or strongly supportive), evaluation of the Palestinian Authority, political or religious faction most trusted (PA President Yasser Arafat, Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin), political party or faction currently best able to help achieve goals (Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

Correlation Matrix


	suicide attack	optimism	Peace	PA	Arafat	Yaseen	FATAH	HAMAS	PIJ	PFLP
suicide attack	1.000	-.949	-.942	-.605	-.961	.715	-.752	.918	.866	.520
optimism	-.949	1.000	.938	.731	.984	-.751	.891	-.894	-.891	-.564
Peace	-.942	.938	1.000	.802	.984	-.885	.804	-.973	-.946	-.300
PA	-.605	.731	.802	1.000	.776	-.912	.873	-.816	-.725	-.144
Arafat	-.961	.984	.984	.776	1.000	-.824	.859	-.945	-.931	-.443
Yaseen	.715	-.751	-.885	-.912	-.824	1.000	-.757	.927	.857	.001
FATAH	-.752	.891	.804	.873	.859	-.757	1.000	-.806	-.704	-.588
HAMAS	.918	-.894	-.973	-.816	-.945	.927	-.806	1.000	.894	.286
PIJ	.866	-.891	-.946	-.725	-.931	.857	-.704	.894	1.000	.141
PFLP	.520	-.564	-.300	-.144	-.443	.001	-.588	.286	.141	1.000

6 observations were used in this computation.

13 cases were omitted due to missing values.


Regression analyses on the JMCC poll results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that Palestinians' optimism about the future ($r = .89$, $F = 41.99$, $p < .0001$), support for the peace process ($r = .94$, $F = 57.96$, $p < .001$), trust in Fatah ($r = .57$, $F = 4.77$, $p = .05$) and trust in Fatah leader Yasser Arafat ($r = .82$, $F = 19.81$, $p = .001$) are significant *negative* predictors of popular support for suicide attack against Israeli civilians, whereas trust in Hamas ($r = .83$, $F = 22.45$, $p < .001$), PIJ ($r = .71$, $F = 10.15$, $p < .01$) and Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin ($r = .58$, $F = 4.99$, $p = .05$) are significant *positive* predictors.

Figure 1. Power Law Distribution: Log (No. Terrorist Incidents) X Log (No. Deaths from Terrorism).



Source: Robert Axelrod, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.

Figure 2. Consequences of removing an emergent leader in a decentralized and distributed cellular network. The node labeled “DEAD” denotes the position that the original leader would have held if he had not been eliminated. The original leader operated as a “gatekeeper” between the left and right sides of the network, managing key resources, knowledge and access to other important agents. A new “LEADER” emerges in the same vicinity as the dead leader. This newly emergent leader is neither the most central (having the most network ties) nor does he re-establish ties that were lost with the former leader. In the long run, multiple new leaders emerge. “CLEADER” denotes the position of a central agent who is now also emerging as a leader. A third “LEADER” emerges in a structural position very similar to that of the dead leader. The appearance of two new leaders near the original leader indicates that the structure of the task, knowledge and resource networks in that vicinity (not visible) conjointly favor the development of emergent leaders. After the original leader was removed, tasks and resources could be redistributed, agents had to rely on other experts, and multiple leaders could eventually emerge.



Source: Kathleen Carley, Dept. of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University

Notes

¹ Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97 (August 2003), pp. 434-361, 2003.

² “Terrorists and Suicide Attacks” (Congressional Res. Service Rep., Lib. Congress, Washington, DC, August 28, 2003, p. 12), www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058.pdf.

³ See supplementary online materials for Scott Atran, “Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism,” *Science*, vol. 304, April 2, 2004, pp. 47-49, <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/304/5667/47/DC1>.

⁴ The suicide attacks in Baghdad, Karbala and Quetta on the Shi’ite holy day of Ashura further suggest that the transnational jihadist terrorist network is mutating into an acephalous structure no longer willing or able to control anti-Shi’ite elements pursuing their own regional aims. Regional groups like Iraq’s Ansar al-Islam and Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammed (which recently also tried to kill Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf) seem to be coordinating strategy and perhaps tactical operations. Following al-Qaeda’s example, but not its direction against turning on Shi’ites (in the early 1990s al-Qaeda operatives visited Hizbollah training camps in southern Lebanon; bin Laden pointedly praised the Shi’ite extremist group, Saudi Hizbollah, for the 1996 suicide attack on U.S. military housing at Khobar Towers) these groups are now “swarming” on their own initiative - homing in from scattered locations on multiple targets then dispersing, only to form new swarms. Although these groups share motivations and methods with al-Qaeda, they have had only distant relations with Osama bin Laden and the few score of Sunni salafists around him who formed al-Qaeda’s core. (For years, Ansar al-Islam’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi led *Tawhid*, a disparate network of terrorists and sympathizers in the Middle East and Europe, following an agenda similar to bin Laden’s but acting independently and sometimes in rivalry with al-Qaeda).

Bin Laden and the Qaeda hardcore may be reverting back to their pre-9/11 status as just one hub of a loosely-knit transnational network of mujahedeen leaders left over from the Soviet-Afghan war. Only after the FBI began investigating the 1998 American embassy bombings in Africa did U.S. prosecutors in the Southern District Court of New York – and the rest of the world - begin referring to al-Qaeda as “a worldwide terrorist organization led by bin Laden.” The subsequent interconnection of regional jihadist groups into an “al-Qaeda network” may be, in part, the result of the U.S. over-attributing to bin Laden and al-Qaeda a global concentration of power and organization. The November 2003 suicide bombings in Istanbul appear to be a case in point. Turkish officials, as well as many other in the West, immediately attributed the bombings to al-Qaeda – although the bombs were probably made and detonated by local Turkish groups claiming to represent al-Qaeda’s aims.

⁵ Scott Atran, “A Leaner, Meaner Jihad,” *New York Times*, March 16, 2004, p. A25.

⁶ *The Military Balance 2003–2004*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Arundel House, London, October 15, 2003.

⁷ Dave Moniz, Tom Squitieri, “Defense Memo: A Grim Outlook,” *USA Today*, October 22, 2003, p. 1.

⁸ “Changing minds, winning peace: A new strategic direction for U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim world” (Rep. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, October 1, 2003), <http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/testimony/winningpeace/24882.pdf>.

⁹ “Mubarak: Arabs hate U.S. more than ever,” *Reuters* news wire, April 20, 2004.

¹⁰ Christopher Marquis, “U.S. Image abroad Will Take Years to Repair, Official Says,” *New York Times*, February 5, 2004, p. A5.

¹¹ Christopher Lee, “Most say they are less safe since 9/11,” *Washington Post*, 1 April 2004, p. A3.

¹² Fazlur Rahman Khalil interviewed on *60 Minutes II* (CBS news), October 15, 2000.

¹³ Rahul Behdi, “India ‘will go to war after the monsoon,’” *News Telegraph*, May 21, 2002, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/05/21/wkash21.xml; Rory McCarthy, “Dangerous game of state-sponsored terrorism that threatens nuclear conflict,” *The Guardian*, May 25, 2002. The danger of nuclear confrontation on a “one-rung” escalation ladder, where any use of nuclear weapons entails massive use, is particularly acute for countries, like Pakistan and Israel, that have practically no territorial depth.

¹⁴ The Middle East Resource Exchange Database, August 14, 2003, www.mered.org/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=132&FORUM_ID=1&CAT_ID=1&Forum_Title=News&Topic_Title=Data+Shows+Suicide+Bombers+Young%2C+Well+Educated; the MERED data have been updated through 2003. The breakdown of successful attacks is: Hamas = 51, Palestinian Islamic Jihad = 27, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades = 31, other Fatah groups = 7, Popular / Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine = 3, unknown = 10.

- ¹⁵ David Sanger, “President says military phase in Iraq has ended,” *New York Times*, May 2, 2003.
- ¹⁶ Cofer Black, cited in Walter Pincus, Dana Priest, “Spy Agencies’ Optimism on Al Qaeda is Growing: Lack of Attacks Thought to Show Group Is Nearly Crippled,” *Washington Post*, May 6, 2003, sec. A, p. 16.
- ¹⁷ “President Bush, Ambassador Bremer Discuss Progress in Iraq,” White House release, October 27, 2003.
- ¹⁸ Neil MacFarquhar, “Arab World of Two Minds about U.S. Involvement in Iraq,” *New York Times*, October 29, 2003, p. A10.
- ¹⁹ “Combating terrorism: Interagency framework and agency programs to address the overseas threat” (U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, DC., May 23, 2003, p. 4), www.gao.gov/new.items/do3165.pdf.
- ²⁰ For example: “Saddam Hussein was an evil tyrant who wreaked havoc and abused his people for many decades. As Muslims we believe wholeheartedly in the miserable ending of all tyrants, including the one who parade today as triumphant victors.” From: “What after the Capture of Saddam,” December 16, 2003, www.islamonline.net/livedialogue/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=mYDRef.
- ²¹ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., February 2003, p. 13, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/strategy/>.
- ²² “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and to the American People,” White House news release, September 20, 2001. “Bush: ‘Al Qaeda Types’ Committing Terror in Iraq,” *Fox News*, August 22, 2003. “These killers don’t have values,” President Bush declared in response to the spreading insurgency in Iraq in April 2004, “terrorists can’t stand freedom,” *The Times and Democrat*, April 19, 2004, <http://thetandd.com/articles/2004/04/06/opinion/opinion1.txt>.
- ²³ “Views of a Changing World 2003,” Survey Report, Pew Research Center, June 3, 2003, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>.
- ²⁴ Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World: Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 2 (2002), pp. 229-249. Mark Tessler, Dan Corstange, “How should Americans Understand Arab and Muslim political attitudes,” *Journal of Social Affairs*, vol. 19 (2002).
- ²⁵ Khalil Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 9, October 7-14, 2003, www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9a.html.
- ²⁶ “DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Vol. 2: DSB Force Protection Panel Report to DSB,” U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., December 1997, p. 8, www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/trans2.pdf.
- ²⁷ Colum Lynch, “Volunteers swell a reviving Qaeda, UN warns,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 19, 2002, p. 3.
- ²⁸ Gary Becker, “Crime and punishment: An economic approach,” *Political Economy*, vol. 76 (1968), pp. 169-217.
- ²⁹ Alan Krueger, Jitka Malecková, “Seeking the roots of terror,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 6, 2003, <http://chronicle.com/free/v49/i39/39b01001.htm>
- ³⁰ Alan Krueger, “Poverty doesn’t create terrorists,” *New York Times*, May 29, 2003.
- ³¹ *Discouraging Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 2.
- ³² The U.S. State Dept. budget (fiscal 2003) for Foreign Military Financing includes as top receivers: Israel (\$2.1 billion), Egypt (\$1.3 billion), Columbia (\$98 million), Pakistan (\$50 million). Special Support Funds are also budgeted in emergency supplemental bills: \$600 million for Pakistan (half targeted for direct military assistance); \$40.5 million in economic and law enforcement assistance for Uzbekistan; \$45 million in military financing for Turkey and Uzbekistan; \$42.2 million for training and equipment for security forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan; and added millions in special Defense Department funds for counterterrorism in Central Asian Republics. Michelle Ciarrocca, William Hartung, “Increases In Military Spending And Security Assistance Since 9/11/01,” Arms Trade Resource Center, October 4, 2002, www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/SpendingDOD911.html.
- ³³ Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regularly document “horrific” and “massive” human rights abuses occurring in countries that receive the most U.S. aid in absolute terms (Israel, Egypt, Colombia, Pakistan) and the greatest relative increase in aid (Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Turkey). For details, see supplementary online materials for Scott Atran, “Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism,” *Science*, vol. 304, April 2, 2004, pp. 47-49, <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/304/5667/47/DC1>.
- ³⁴ « Global Terrorism Index 2003/4 » (World Markets Research Centre, 18 August 2003) ; available at www.worldmarketsanalysis.com. According to the 2003 World Terrorism Index (compiled primarily for multinational investors), Columbia, Israel and Pakistan top the list of places at risk for terrorist attack (Egypt has

been relatively quiet since the late 1990s, when Egypt's Islamic Jihad essentially fused with al-Qaeda to initiate action on a more global scale). Iraq, not previously a major risk, has leapt to the forefront.

³⁵ "September 11 One Year Later," U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., September 2002, p. 14, usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0902/ijge/ijge0902.htm. According to Secretary of State Colin Powell: "Terrorism really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair and hopelessness," World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2003, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/16869.htm. See also "The Link between Poverty and Terrorism," statement by minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, Baroness Symons, House of Lords, London, February 27, 2002; Interview with Christopher Patten, European Union Foreign Affairs Commissioner, *United Nations World Chronicle Transcript*, April 7, 2004, <http://207.36.70.90/pattentrans.html>.

³⁶ White House press release, March 22, 2002. See also comments by Nobel Peace Prize laureates, in J. Jai, "Getting at the Roots of Terrorism," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 10, 2001, p. 7.

³⁷ Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* vol. 299, March 7, 2003, pp. 1534–1539.

³⁸ Wesley Clark, address to Veterans of Foreign Wars, Nashua, N.H., C-Span television, December 20, 2003.

³⁹ David Von Drehle, "Debate over Iraq Focuses on Outcome," *Washington Post*, 7 Oct. 2002, p. A1.

⁴⁰ D. Cheney, interviewed on *Fox News* (with Brit Hume), 17 March 2004.

⁴¹ "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism," Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., September 1999, p. 40, www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf.

⁴² Scott Atran, "Who Wants to Be a Martyr," *New York Times*, May 5, 2003, p. A23. When asked if they belong to al-Qaeda, detainees will sometimes respond, "I don't know." They are not lying or being evasive. These people well understand the general mission and message of al-Qaeda – to expel non-believers from Muslim lands and politically unite Muslims under religious authority. But al-Qaeda is more of an idea than a thing. Scott Atran, cited in Corine Hegland, "Global Jihad," *National Journal*, May 8, 2004, p. 1402.

⁴³ "White Paper—The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests," Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, January 9, 2003, <http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=667&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0&mode=arc>.

⁴⁴ Raphael Ezekiel, *The Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen* (Viking, New York, 1995).

⁴⁵ *Al-Ahram Al-Arabi* (Cairo), February 3, 2001.

⁴⁶ Richard Nisbett, *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently and Why*. (Free Press, New York, 2003).

⁴⁷ Jeremy Weinstein, "Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment," Center for Global Development, Working Paper, November 2003.

⁴⁸ Brian Barber, *Heart and Stones: Palestinian Youth from the Intifada* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003).

⁴⁹ Mia Bloom, "Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror," In *Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror* (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, in press). In 2001, militant factions of the main "secular" nationalist groups, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades), began using language and tactics of martyrdom and Jihad to compete with increasingly popular Islamic groups for public support. Al Aqsa' Martyrs Brigades, January 10, 2003, www.idf.il/newsite/english/0112-2.stm; "Communiqués of the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, March 15 - April 25, 2002," www.tao.ca/~solidarity/texts/palestine/PFLPcommuniques.html; cf. Hamas communiqué (Qassem Brigades), August 9, 2001, www.intellnet.org/resources/hamas_communiques/hamas/comm_text/2001/9_aug_01.htm.

⁵⁰ David Rhode, C.J. Chivers, "Qaeda's Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing," *New York Times*, March 17, 2002, p. A1.

⁵¹ Studies of people who become torturers for their governments demonstrate the eventual power of such blind obedience. See Mika Haritos-Fatouros, "The Official Torturer: A Learning Model for Obedience to the Authority of Violence," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 18 (1988): 1107–1120. The recent scandal involving American servicemen torturing Iraqi prisoners, which has been attributed by American military investigators to "leadership failure" and "lack of supervision" that allowed deviant "criminal" behavior, may in fact result from a less direct and more pervasive culture of abuse promoted by authorities in military intelligence. "Leadership Failure Led to Prison Abuse, Says US General," *Agence France Presse* wire, May 12, 2004, <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040512/1/3k6s5.html>; Peter Slevin, "Red Cross Describes Systematic Abuse in Iraq," *Washington Post*, May 10, 2004.

⁵² Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (Viking Press, New York, 1970).

⁵³ Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (Harper & Row, New York, 1974).

⁵⁴ Basel, Saleh, "Economic conditions and Resistance to occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a causal connection." Paper presented to the Graduate Student forum, Kansas State Univ. April 4, 2003. Saleh

compiled information on 171 militants killed in action (nearly all during the Second Intifada, 2000-2003) from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) news services, including 87 suicide attackers.[1] Majorities of militants were unmarried males (20-29 yrs.), from families with both parents living and 8-15 siblings, and who completed secondary school or attended college. Suicide attackers, which included bombers (29 Hamas, 18 PIJ) and shooters (14 Hamas, 26 PIJ), had more pronounced tendencies in these directions. A majority of Hamas bombers attended college; PIJ had more shooters aged 14-19. Majorities of bombers, but few shooters, had prior histories of arrest or injury by Israel's army; however, most shooters had one or more family members with such histories.

⁵⁵ Ariel Merari, "Social, organization, and psychological factors in suicide terrorism. In *Root causes of suicide terrorism* (Routledge, London, in press).

⁵⁶ Scott Atran, "Who Wants to Be a Martyr," *New York Times*, May 5, 2003, p. A23.

⁵⁷ Trent Lott, cited in *The Hill*, October 29, 2003.

⁵⁸ Timothy Spangler, interviewed on BBC News, January 21, 2003.

⁵⁹ "Views of a Changing World 2003," Survey Report, Pew Research Center, June 3, 2003, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>.

⁶⁰ One possibility is to offer and guarantee a clear resolution of « final status » acceptable to majorities of Israelis and Palestinians. Without clear resolution of final status *before* implementation of « confidence building » measures, with an understanding by all parties of what to expect in the end, it is likely that doubts about ultimate intentions will undermine any interim accord – as in every case since 1948. Scott Atran, "Stones against the Iron Fist, Terror within the Nation," *Politics and Society*, vol. 18 (1990), pp. 481-526.

⁶¹ Scott Atran, *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁶² Robert Frank, *Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions* (Norton, New York, 1988).

⁶³ "A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists," Pew Research Center Survey Report, March 16, 2004, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>.

⁶⁴ Regression analyses on the JMCC poll results in Table 1 indicate that Palestinians' optimism about the future ($r = .89$, $F = 41.99$, $p < .0001$), support for the peace process ($r = .94$, $F = 57.96$, $p < .001$), trust in Fatah ($r = .57$, $F = 4.77$, $p = .05$) and trust in Fatah leader Yasser Arafat ($r = .82$, $F = 19.81$, $p = .001$) are significant *negative* predictors of popular support for suicide attack against Israeli civilians, whereas trust in Hamas ($r = .83$, $F = 22.45$, $p < .001$), PIJ ($r = .71$, $F = 10.15$, $p < .01$) and Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin ($r = .58$, $F = 4.99$, $p = .05$) are significant *positive* predictors. Official Israeli claims that Arafat is the chief beneficiary and supporter of suicide attack against Israelis make little historical sense in view of the fact that Palestinian popular support for him (and for the Palestinian Authority he heads) consistently wanes in the face of martyr operations. Indeed, Israel's physical isolation of Arafat and its systematic devastation of the Palestinian Authority's political, economic and social infrastructure have arguably rendered ineffective the one historically reliable institutional constraint on suicide attack against Israelis. It is noteworthy that the al-Qaeda recruitment video titled "Destroying the Cole," which was first circulated in early 2001 (some months after the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 and well into the second Palestinian Intifada), explicitly condemned Arafat for opposing "martyrdom" operations.

⁶⁵ Under these circumstances, as political groups compete to outbid one another for "political market share," there is also increased radicalization, splintering and "Islamization" of what were once the dominant and primarily secular nationalist groups, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades). [M. Bloom, "Palestinian suicide bombing: Public support, market share and outbidding," *Pol. Sci. Quart.* (in press)].

⁶⁶ Following the *Jerusalem Post* editorial, "Kill Arafat" (9 Sept. 2003), which was accompanied by initial support from Sharon's deputy, Ehud Olmert, for assassination "as an option" and by further Israeli incursions in the West Bank and Gaza, popular Palestinian support *both* for Yasser Arafat (50% favorable) *and* suicide attack (75% favorable) increased significantly. [Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 9 Palestine Centre for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, 15 Oct. 2003], www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9epressrelease.html. Popular opinion expresses no doubt that Palestinian Authority became increasingly venal as its infrastructure collapsed (support for the PA remains at 28%), but turning people from a culture of corruption may be more manageable than turning them from the cult of killing.

⁶⁷ Kathleen Carley, "Modeling covert networks," Paper presented to the workshop on Culture and Personality in Models of Adversarial Decision-Making, U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 13 Nov. 2003, Arlington, VA. See K. Carley, "Estimating vulnerabilities in large covert networks," Institute for Software research International, Carnegie Mellon University, April, 2004.

⁶⁸ When I posed this issue to a representative of the Israeli Security Services (Shin Beit) at an FBI meeting in Charlottesville, VA (April 5, 2004), he responded that assassination of Hizbollah leaders may have helped to make that organization stronger. Concerning targeted assassination of Hamas leaders, he acknowledged that short-term considerations (disrupting the current spate of attempted suicide attacks, then averaging 48 per day) trumped consideration of long-term prospects for Israeli security. “What else can we do?” he concluded.

⁶⁹ “Combating terrorism: Interagency framework and agency programs to address the overseas threat” (U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, DC, 23 May 2003), p. 24, www.gao.gov/new.items/do3165.pdf. The “new partners in the war on terrorism” cited are the Eurasian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Georgia. All but Tajikistan – and just recently, Georgia - is run by former Communist Party leaders-turned-nationalists, whose rule – like Saddam’s – involves brutal personality cults.

⁷⁰ George W. Bush, introduction to *National Security Strategy of the United States*, White House, Washington, D.C., September 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

⁷¹ Robert McNamara, “In Retrospect—The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam,” address to the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 25, 1995, www.ksg.harvard.edu/ifactory/ksgpress/www/ksg_news/transcripts/mcnamara.htm.

⁷² Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, New York, 2004).

⁷³ In Jefferson’s words: “That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition.” Thomas Jefferson to I. McPherson, August 13, 1813, in *The Founder’s Constitution*, vol. 3, art. 1. sec. 8, clause 8, doc. 12 (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.

⁷⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996). If, as Huntington argues, civilizations are cultures writ large, then the same dynamical processes apply to civilizations as to cultures. Cultures, like species have no fixed boundaries or essential structures. Unlike species, they also interchange elements and merge, and split and remarry in ways that are always somewhat unpredictable (Scott Atran, *In Gods We Trust*). There is nothing fixed or inevitable in human history and international relations, no matter how hard people think it so, or try to make it so. There are always contingent and unpredictable events, and there is always an element of uncertainty between expectations and outcomes. In politics, as in economics, the most well-structured policies and practices are the ones that also produce the greatest variety and impact of unintended consequences and cascading effects, which makes them the most liable to revolutionary fall and overthrow. This may be a general characteristic of complex, dynamical systems that have “looping effects” (where agents’ actions affect environments that, in turn, affect agents’ actions), including systems involved in biological and cultural evolution. See Stuart Kauffman, *The Origins of Order* (Oxford Univ., New York, 1993). Indeed, bin Laden – who sometimes talks as if he studied Huntington the way Mao studied Marx - may have successfully “looped” the U.S. into a cycle of action-reaction that is turning a “clash of civilizations” into an emergent reality. The opposing but parallel American and Jihadist discourses of “good” versus “evil” and “civilization” versus “barbarism” certainly encourage this development.

⁷⁵ For Thomas Friedman, Pulitzer-prize winning *New York Times* columnist: “The emerging global order needs an enforcer. That’s America’s new burden.” Thomas Friedman, “Manifesto for the Free World,” *New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1999, p. 40. Most critical is American enforcement of open markets - a view that George Soros refers to as “market fundamentalism.” For Friedman, “The driving idea behind globalization is free-market capitalism--the more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free trade and competition, the more efficient and flourishing your economy will be. Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world.” [*ibid.* p. 42]. Those who believe 9/11 shattered the reality or dream of globalization are dead wrong. Thomas Friedman, “Is Google God?” *New York Times*, June 29, 2003. From this vantage, suicide attacks against the U.S. presence in Iraq “are a fundamental threat to civilization.” Thomas Friedman, “Is Peace Possible?” *Paula Zahn Now*, CNN television, October 28, 2003. Those who sponsor or tolerate suicide attacks “unlike many leftists – they understand exactly what this war is about.... They understand that this is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched – a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world.” Thomas Friedman, “It’s no Vietnam,” *New York Times*, October 30, 2003. Iraq is “no Vietnam,” because the “real” aim of the war is not “to shore up a corrupt status quo, as in Vietnam.” [*ibid.*] Nevertheless, U.S. leaders in the Vietnam era believed that they, too, were on a global mission to save the world from evil (communism) by nurturing democracy far from home (South Vietnam). B. Van De Mark, R. McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (Vintage, New York, 1996).

⁷⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1992). Historically, emergence of liberal democracy of the kind envisaged for Iraq requires a high degree of nationalism as

the individuals' primary source of social identity; nationalism, in turn, depends upon a significant degree of social and economic mobility across cultural boundaries that comes with industrialization. Without an overriding sense of nationalism, "Liberal democracy is not very good at adjudicating the claims of longstanding linguistic or ethnic communities living on their traditional territory within multi-ethnic societies." Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal democracy as a global phenomenon," *PS: Politics and Society*, vol. 24 (1991), pp. 659-664. There is little indication that Iraqi nationalism – a strategic ploy initiated by the British to help them control the population and the region between Turkey and Persia – overrides ethnic allegiance. But that only makes the nation-building experiment in Iraq more challenging and invigorating for America's effort to implement its world-historical will. There is no real alternative because: "liberal democracy alone provides the possibility of fully rational recognition of human dignity" and "there is a rational and progressive pattern to world history." (*ibid.*) Using a faith-based logic reminiscent of Marxist-Leninist arguments that the inevitable historical direction of world history may use a helping hand to speed it along, Fukuyama opines: "We are for better or worse in the nation-building business. It indicates an increasing trend in world politics ... for failed states and troubled countries." Francis Fukuyama in A. Stephens, "J. Garners says U.S. action in Iraq will change entire Middle East," *U.N. Wire* (United Nations Foundation), August 1, 2003, www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030801/449_7157.asp. History ends, it appears, only if it can be fixed – but it won't be. Modern history is chock full of revolutionary ideologies that brought about their own destruction in an impossible attempt to realize an end to history (anarchism, Hegelianism, Marxism, Nazism, Pol Potism, Khomeneism, etc.).

⁷⁷ Robert Wright, *Nonzero: The logic of human destiny* (Random House, New York, 2000).

⁷⁸ According to Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, founder of the London branch of Hizb al-Tahrir ("Islamic Freedom Party") and a supporter of the *World Islamic Front*: "motivating the people to rebel against the regime under which they are living [is] the establishment of al-Khilafah whose foreign policy is to conquer the whole world by Jihad. ... As for secularism, Islam considers anyone adopting this to have committed an act of apostasy." J. Reynolds, "Radical Islamic cleric apparently threatens House of Commons," *American Daily*, 27 July 2003, <http://www.americandaily.com/item/1793>.

⁷⁹ "From Masada to Jenin," *The Palestine Chronicle*, January 10, 2003, www.palestinechronicle.com/story.php?sid=20030110102946113.

⁸⁰ Interview with Dr. Abdallah Shalah on *Al Manar* (Hizbollah television), cited in "Arab accounts back Israeli version of Jenin," *WorldNetDaily*, April 24, 2002, www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27370.

⁸¹ Abu Shihab al-Kandahari, *Fatwah* on "Nuclear warfare as the solution for destroying America," December 26, 2002 (reissued, September 16, 2003). Saudi cleric Sheikh Naser al-Fahd also declared in a *fatwah*: "use of WMD's is permissible, even knowing that it will kill every infidel it lands upon, including women and children." See Reuven Paz, "The first Islamist *Fatwah* on the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," PRISM special dispatches on Global Jihad, no. 1, May, 2003, www.e-prism.org/images/The%20age%20of%20non%20conventional%20terrorism.doc. In the *Ghazwa* of April 6, 2004 (weekly Urdu jihadi publication of *Jammat-ud-Dawa* – formerly *Lashkar-e-Tayibah*), Hafez Sayeed, erstwhile leader of *Lashkar-e-Tayibah*, declared: "Mass killings of the non-believers is the only solution to international conflicts... in the Muslims' favor."